The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has often been shaped by complex alliances, covert operations, and pragmatic decision-making that defy conventional narratives. Among the more intriguing episodes of this history is Israel's covert arms sales to Iran during the early years of the Islamic Republic, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. These transactions, predating the infamous Iran-Contra affair, highlight a nuanced period of Israeli-Iranian relations and shed light on the realpolitik driving state behavior during the tumultuous early 1980s.
Historical Context: The Israeli-Iranian Relationship Pre-1979
Before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran and Israel maintained a close, albeit discreet, alliance. Under the Shah’s regime, the two nations shared mutual strategic interests, including countering Arab nationalism and the rise of Soviet influence in the region. Iran, a major oil producer, supplied Israel with energy, while Israel provided military and technological assistance. This partnership was rooted in pragmatism, as both nations found themselves isolated within the broader Arab-Muslim world.
The overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s public posture toward Israel. Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric denounced the Jewish state as the "Little Satan" (a term paired with the "Great Satan" label for the United States) and championed the Palestinian cause. Despite these ideological differences, covert dealings between the two nations persisted, driven by mutual interests.
The Strategic Calculus Behind Israeli Arms Sales
The early 1980s presented Israel with a complex security environment. The Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980, posed a significant dilemma for Israeli policymakers. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was seen as a far greater threat to Israel than Iran, given its history of animosity, participation in past Arab-Israeli wars, and pursuit of nuclear capabilities. From Israel’s perspective, a prolonged conflict between Iraq and Iran would serve to weaken both adversaries, reducing the likelihood of a unified Arab front against the Jewish state.
Despite Iran’s anti-Israel rhetoric, the new regime was desperate for weapons to sustain its war effort against Iraq. The revolutionary purges of the Iranian military had left it in disarray, and the international arms embargo imposed on Iran further exacerbated its vulnerabilities. Israel, possessing surplus U.S.-made weapons and parts compatible with Iran’s pre-revolutionary arsenal, saw an opportunity to exploit Iran’s predicament for strategic and economic gain.
The Arms Deals in Detail
Reports suggest that Israeli arms shipments to Iran began as early as 1981, facilitated through intermediaries and third-party states to maintain plausible deniability. The transactions included spare parts for American-made fighter jets, tanks, and artillery, as well as ammunition and other military equipment. These sales were often routed through European companies or facilitated by Iranian arms dealers operating outside the country.
One of the primary conduits for these deals was Yaakov Nimrodi, a former Israeli military attaché in Tehran during the Shah’s reign. Nimrodi leveraged his connections within Iran and the Israeli defense establishment to broker deals that were mutually beneficial. Another figure reportedly involved was Al Schwimmer, an Israeli aviation pioneer with a history of involvement in covert arms trading.
The financial arrangements were equally clandestine, with payments often made in cash or through third-party banks. Israel’s motivations were twofold: weakening Iraq by ensuring Iran could continue its war effort and generating revenue for its own defense industry.
U.S. Knowledge and Tacit Approval
The United States, under the Reagan administration, was aware of these covert arms transfers and, in some cases, tacitly approved them. The primary concern for Washington was preventing a decisive Iraqi victory, which could destabilize the region and threaten U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. While officially maintaining an embargo on arms sales to Iran, the U.S. recognized the utility of Israel’s actions in balancing the regional power dynamics.
This tacit approval would later evolve into direct involvement during the Iran-Contra affair, where senior U.S. officials facilitated arms sales to Iran in exchange for hostages and to fund Contra rebels in Nicaragua. However, Israel’s independent dealings with Iran predated and set the stage for these more infamous transactions.
Iranian Pragmatism Amid Revolutionary Ideology
While the Islamic Republic publicly condemned Israel, its acceptance of arms shipments underscores the pragmatism that often underpins state behavior, even among ideologically driven regimes. Iran’s primary objective during the early 1980s was survival, and Khomeini’s government prioritized the war effort over ideological purity. This pragmatism is further evidenced by the fact that Iran also received arms from other unlikely sources, including China and North Korea.
The covert nature of these dealings allowed both Israel and Iran to maintain public postures consistent with their ideological narratives. For Iran, this meant continuing its denunciation of Israel while quietly acquiring the means to sustain its military campaign. For Israel, it meant undermining a common enemy without compromising its broader strategic interests.
The Legacy and Lessons
The Israeli arms sales to Iran during Khomeini’s early years have left a complex legacy. On one hand, these dealings highlight the flexibility of state behavior in pursuit of strategic objectives, even when such behavior appears to contradict official policies or public rhetoric. On the other hand, they underscore the unintended consequences that often accompany covert operations.
For Israel, the arms sales to Iran achieved their immediate objectives but also contributed to the long-term militarization of the Islamic Republic, which would later emerge as a regional rival. For Iran, the transactions demonstrated the regime’s willingness to compromise on ideological principles for pragmatic ends, a pattern that continues to influence its foreign policy.
The episode also serves as a cautionary tale for policymakers, illustrating the risks of short-term strategies that prioritize immediate gains over long-term stability. The arms deals, while successful in weakening Iraq during the 1980s, may have inadvertently strengthened a future adversary in Iran, complicating the security landscape for Israel and its allies in subsequent decades.
Conclusion
The covert arms sales from Israel to Khomeini’s Iran before the Iran-Contra affair exemplify the intricate and often paradoxical nature of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Driven by a combination of pragmatism, strategic calculus, and opportunism, these transactions defied the public narratives of enmity between the two states. While they achieved their immediate goals, the long-term implications of these dealings continue to resonate in the region’s complex and volatile dynamics. As history shows, the alliances and rivalries of today are rarely as immutable as they appear, shaped as they are by the ever-shifting currents of geopolitics.
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